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PAWING OPEN THE COURTHOUSE DOOR:
WHY ANIMALS' INTERESTS SHOULD
MATTER WHEN COURTS GRANT
STANDING
LAUREN MAGNOTTIt

"[Tihe difference in mind between man and the higher
animals... is one of degree and not of kind. We have seen that
the senses and intuitions, the various emotions and faculties, such
as love, memory, attention,curiosity, imitation, reason, [etc.], of
which man boasts, may be found ... in the lower animals."
-Charles Darwin1
INTRODUCTION

Animals do not have legal personhood and are treated as
property under the law. 2 While such a legal classification may
not comport with people's common interactions with animals, it
is nonetheless the prevailing law.
Due to their status as
3
property, animals have no standing to bring suit themselves,
and individuals and organizations that bring legal actions on
behalf of mistreated animals regularly find their suits dismissed
due to lack of standing. 4 Courts view the abuse of animals as

t J.D. expected 2006, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 1998, University
of Pennsylvania.
1 CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN 319 (Encyc. Britannica, Inc. 1952)
(1871).
2 See generally Jett v. Mun. Court of San Diego, 223 Cal. Rptr. 111, 113-15 (Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that ownership of a tortoise was not subject to forfeiture even
though the owner treated it with cruelty); Mass. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 158 N.E.2d 487, 490, 493-94, 496 (Mass. 1959)
(finding that a statute authorizing the use of lost and strayed animals from a pound
for the purpose of scientific experiments was constitutional because those animals
were abandoned property). For a thorough discussion of the status of animals as
property and the impact this has on the treatment of animals, see GARY L.
FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (1995).
3 Occasionally, however, animals have been plaintiffs themselves, bringing suit
in their own right. See discussion infra Part II.D.
4 In San Juan Audubon Society v. Wildlife Services, wildlife preservation groups
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peripheral to the "real injury" of the person bringing suit,
creating a fallacy in these cases whereby an injury to a person is
often fabricated so that the real case to protect the animals may
5
ensue.
In order for any cause of action to proceed, the party
bringing suit must meet the constitutional requirements for
standing.6 First, the party bringing suit must have experienced
an injury in fact and, second, the plaintiffs injuries must have
been caused by the defendant. 7 Finally, the court must be able to
redress the plaintiffs injury if the plaintiff prevails on the
merits.8
In addition to the constitutionally mandated
requirements, the courts may impose prudential requirements
before holding that a party has standing. These include the
general prohibition of raising a third party's legal rights, the
requirement that the suit fall within the "zone of interests" of the

sued the Secretary of Agriculture and Wildlife Services (part of the Department of
Agriculture). The defendants implemented a livestock-protection program. As part of
the program, predator animals were killed with cyanide-ejector devices planted in
the ground. The plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to follow proper procedures
and thereby placed endangered species in danger of being poisoned with cyanide.
The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the members of the
plaintiff organizations failed to prove that they had concrete plans to view the
endangered species in the future. See San Juan Audubon Soc'y v. Wildlife Servs.,
257 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135, 139-42 (D.D.C. 2003). Similarly, in Fund for Animals v.
Norton, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2003), groups and individuals dedicated to
conserving animals in their natural habitats sued to prevent the importation of
Argali sheep for sport hunting. Id. at 2. The court held that the plaintiffs' victory
would not adequately curb the killing of the sheep because the countries from which
the sheep were being imported would not improve their conservation efforts just
because importation permits had been denied in the United States. See id. at 7. The
plaintiffs' injuries would not be redressed even if they prevailed in their suit, and the
court denied standing in part on that basis. See id.
5 See discussion infra Part II.A.
6 For a complete overview on the issue of standing as related to animals, see
discussion infra Part II.
7 See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
8 See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-71 (1992)
(demonstrating the strict adherence to these constitutional requirements). The
Supreme Court held that, despite a statutory provision that expressly allowed "all
citizens" to bring suit, citizens still needed to prove a concrete injury in fact. See id.
at 576, 578. The Court stated that to allow Congress to give citizens the option to sue
over a general public interest would be to reduce the significance of the separation of
powers by transferring from the executive branch to the judiciary the power to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. See id. at 576; see also Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) (discussing the "separation of powers" doctrine with
regard to the standing issue); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973).
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law at issue, and the disallowance of generalized grievances. 9
Thus, to have its case heard in court, a plaintiff must show that
it has experienced a direct injury; arguing that an animal has
been injured is inadequate to establish standing.10
The constitutional injury-in-fact requirement creates a
unique problem for protecting abused animals. Since no direct
harm is committed against the group or individual bringing the
suit, suits brought to protect the interests of abused animals are
frequently dismissed because the plaintiffs cannot prove a direct
injury in fact.11
While judges have slowly become more permissive in
granting standing to those trying to protect animals, even the
most progressive courts directly hold that the standing they
grant is not premised on the mistreatment of the animal itself.
For example, in American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus,12 the court
was innovative in holding that standing was based largely on a
former circus employee's emotional attachment to the elephants
that were being abused. 13
The court also expressly held,
however, that standing was not based on any continuing injury to
14
the animal.
While animals have historically been viewed as property
under the law, it cannot be denied that animals are qualitatively
different than the average piece of personal property, such as a
desk, sweater, or television. Animals are living beings capable of
9 See generally Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12, 17-18
(2004) (holding that "prudential standing encompasses 'the general prohibition on a
litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of
generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of
interests protected by the law invoked' ") (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751)). It is the
"zone of interests" factor which is the prudential requirement most often at issue
where people or organizations attempt to get standing to bring suit on behalf of
animals. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 444-45
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
10 See discussion infra Part II.A.
11 In Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, the court held that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to compel the Navy to stop killing feral goats on San
Clemente Island in California. 765 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1985). Because the
plaintiffs could not prove any direct injury beyond a general interest of the
organization in preventing cruelty to animals, the plaintiffs did not have standing.
See id. at 938-39.
12 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
13 Id. at 338.
14 Id. at 336-37.
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feeling physical pain, experiencing varying degrees of rational
16
thought, 15 and forming seemingly emotional attachments.
Outside of the legal context, it would be quite outdated-if indeed
it was ever plausible-to presume that a family's dog or cat is not
distinct from that family's couch or dining room table. Within
the legal context, however, courts have adopted the view that
animals can be treated under the law as any other inanimate
item of personal property. 17 Such a legal stance is inconsistent
with society's general notions of animals,' 8 as well as a rational,
common-sense view of animals.
The issue of standing is of serious import to the protection of
animals as it is the threshold issue before the merits of the case
can even be considered. While the relief sought in these suits is
generally an injunction to stop the mistreatment of the animals
and/or to have the animals removed from the custody of the
abusers, the current law forces plaintiffs to generate bases for
standing that are essentially unrelated to the relief sought. As a
result, the standing alleged in these suits is a legal fiction, since
the injury being pleaded is often not the injury with which the
parties are typically concerned. 19 To avoid these legal fictions,
courts faced with the standing issue should become more

15 See generally JAMES RACHELS, CREATED FROM ANIMALS: THE MORAL
IMPLICATIONS OF DARWINISM 132-33 (1990) (explaining Darwin's arguments that
animals have similar rational capacities to humans).
16 For most people, it is easiest to relate to this idea in terms of domesticated
animals, which most people view as part of their families. See Elaine T. Byszewski,
Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful Death Cases: A Survey of Current Court
and Legislative Action and a Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary Loss of
Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L. 215, 218-19 (2003) (discussing how courts have tried
to measure a dog's value by taking into account a sentimental element rather than
limiting damages to a nominal amount).
17 See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
1 For example, the entire state of Rhode Island and all cities within Marin
County in California have passed laws which recognize animal caretakers as
"guardians" as opposed to "owners." See The Guardian Campaign, Do You Live in a
Guardian Community?, http://www.guardiancampaign.comlguardiancity.htm (last
visited Nov. 12, 2005) (listing those cities which have become so-called "Guardian
cities"). Thus, on animal tags, adoption forms, signs in public parks, and veterinary
and kennel forms, the term "guardian" must be used. See id.
19 See Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 51-52 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(holding that a challenge to laws allowing increased hunting could be maintained
when the injury in fact was that the members of the Humane Society could not
adequately utilize animal refuge systems, but could not be maintained when the
injury was a strong interest in the "preservation, enhancement and humanitarian
treatment of wildlife").
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progressive by viewing animals as beings with independent
interests. This would not require an abandonment of the legal
classification of animals as property; rather, courts could
recognize that animals are a special type of property entitled to
certain legal protections not afforded to typical inanimate objects.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: WHY ARE ANIMALS TREATED AS
OBJECTS IN WESTERN CULTURE?

While it is impossible within the confines of this Note to
cover thoroughly the origins of animals' treatment as mere
objects, a brief overview of some of the more influential sources is
provided. It should be preliminarily noted that while the concept
of animals as objects is prevalent throughout the West, many
Eastern cultures teach great respect for all living beings, and
20
those cultures do not espouse the views below.
A. Judeo-ChristianOrigins
"[T]he Western concept of private property.., is explicitly
linked to the status of animals as resources that were given to us
by God."2 1 Beginning with the story of Creation in the Book of
Genesis, the Judeo-Christian tradition adopts the premise that
God created humans to rule over animals. After creating the
fish, birds, and cattle, God created mankind in His own image
and "[1let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds
of the air, and the cattle, and over all the wild animals and all
'22
the creatures that crawl on the ground.
The theme of animal subjugation permeates the Bible.
While there are some passages that teach that animals and
humans share many similarities and that animals should be
treated humanely, 23 the Bible generally shows very little regard
20 Gary L. Francione, a law professor and animal-rights activist, noted that
"there are some Eastern religions that promote the sanctity of all life, and... at
least some believers in every religion that adopt the view that animal interests are
morally significant...." GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS:

YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG? 109 (2000).
21 Id. at 51.

Genesis 1:24-26 (New American) (emphasis added).
The Book of Ecclesiastes provides an example:
As for the children of men, it is God's way of testing them and of showing that they
are in themselves like beasts. For the lot of man and of beast is one lot; the one dies
as well as the other. Both have the same life-breath, and man has no advantage over
the beast; but all is vanity.
22
23
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for the humane treatment of animals. Animals are routinely
offered as sacrifices to God in great numbers throughout the
Bible. 24 Indeed, Jesus Himself caused two thousand pigs to jump
over a cliff where they drowned in the sea as He cast out
demons. 25 In describing this incident, St. Augustine said "that to
refrain from the killing of animals ... is the height of
superstition, for[] judging that there are no common rights
between us and the beasts. . ., [h]e sent the devils into a herd of
Surely[] the swine had not sinned." 26 As further
swine ....
evidence of the marginalization of animals in the Bible, Saint
Paul wrote in his letters to the Corinthians that even when the
law of God directly benefited animals, that law was nonetheless
27
created for the benefit of humans.
The treatment of animals in the Judeo-Christian tradition
has directly impacted modern property law. William Blackstone,
who authored the hugely influential Commentaries on the Laws
of England2s at the end of the eighteenth century, relied on the
story of Creation in the Book of Genesis and the divine grant of
authority to humans over animals as the primary justification for
the property rights that humans have in all of nature, including
animals. 29 Blackstone stated, "The Earth, therefore, and all
things therein, are the general property of all mankind, exclusive
of other beings, from the immediate gift of the creator. '30 One
hundred years later, through the writings of James Kent, the
legal status of animals as property carried over into the

Ecclesiastes 3:18-19; see also Proverbs 12:10 ("The just man takes care of his
beast ...").
24 See, e.g., Leviticus 3:1; Numbers 7:87-88; 2 Chronicles 29:32-33.
25 See Mark 5:1-13.
26 PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 192 (3d ed. 2002) (alterations in original)
(quoting SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CATHOLIC AND MANICHAEAN WAYS OF LIFE 102

(Donald A. Gallagher & Idella J. Gallagher trans., The Catholic Univ. of Am. Press
1966)).
27 For example, while the Book of Deuteronomy teaches that oxen should not be
muzzled while working the grain, St. Paul references that passage in a letter to the
Corinthians and says, "Is God concerned about oxen, or is [H]e not really speaking
for our sake? It was written for our sake, because the plowman should plow in hope,
and the thresher in hope of receiving a share." 1 Corinthians 9:9-10; see also
Deuteronomy 25:4. Thus, St. Paul indicates that the law that provides for the
humane treatment of oxen is not meant to benefit the oxen themselves but is meant
to assist humans.
28

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.

29

See JORDAN CURNUT, ANIMALS AND THE LAW 27 (2001).
Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *3).

30
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American common law. 31
B. CartesianPhilosophy
In his studies of science, Descartes asserted that everything
composed of matter operated much like the mechanistic action of
a clock ticking. 32 Because Descartes was a devout Christian, he
needed to resolve his religious beliefs with his determination that
all matter-including humankind-acted mechanistically.3 3 He
thus distinguished humans from other entities composed of
matter by recognizing the presence of a human soul that did not
follow these mechanistic rules. 34 Animals, on the other hand,
had neither souls nor consciousness. 35 According to Descartes,
animals were automata, which meant that they were essentially
36
machines.
During Descartes's life, vivisection (experimentation on live
animals) increased drastically, and physiologists, calling
themselves Cartesians, performed truly horrific experiments on
live animals without anesthesia. 37 For example, eyewitness
accounts report that conscious dogs were nailed to boards by
their four paws and sliced open so that physiologists could
observe their vascular systems. 38 Thus, Descartes's philosophies
regarding the mechanical nature of animals translated into
particularly brutal uses of animals.
Remnants of the Cartesian methods of using animals as
objects for experimentation continue to pervade modern
medicine. For example, research regarding strokes conducted at
Columbia University involved a surgical procedure in which
experimenters removed baboons' left eyes, drilled the bone at the
back of their eye sockets, removed their brains' outer coverings,

31 See id. at 28 ("So we find that from Kent to Blackstone to Justinian, the legal
status of animals as property, with no standing and no rights whatsoever, has been
deeply embedded into the law of Western civilization for many centuries."); STEVEN
M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 42 (2000).

32 See SINGER, supra note 26, at 200.
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 Id.; see TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 3 (1983).
37 See SINGER, supra note 26, at 201.
38 See id. at 201-02. Reportedly the dogs' screams were seen as almost
mechanical reactions to the slicing of their flesh, as opposed to humans' screams,
which would result from fear and pain. See id. at 201.
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and clamped their blood vessels. 39 Employees of the University
subsequently complained that the baboons were not adequately
treated for pain after surgery, lived in such poor conditions that
some resorted to eating their own feces and consistently biting
themselves, and were essentially left to die. 40 While this Note
does not attempt to argue the merits of scientific experimentation
on animals, it proposes that the Cartesian tradition of treating
animals as mere machines is still present in society through
some modes of modern medical experimentation.
C. Lockean Philosophy
The writings of John Locke further reinforced the status of
animals as property in a particularly influential way because his
theories of property powerfully impact modern property law.
Locke argued that an owner of property has exclusive dominion
over and use of the property he owns. 4 1 Locke felt that while the
world was given to humankind collectively, laboring over a
particular parcel of the collective gives an individual private
property rights in that parcel. 42 Locke stated that "[p]roperty,
whose Original is from the Right a Man has to use any of the
Inferior Creatures... is for the benefit and sole Advantage of the
Proprietor, so that he may even destroy the thing, that he has
Property in by his use of it. '' 4 3 Therefore, under Locke's
teachings, property rights "originated in the exclusive control
44
and use of animals that God supposedly gave to humans."
According to Locke, while God gave animals to all humankind, a
person may join his or her work with a particular animal and
45
thus obtain ownership of that animal.

39 See Bryn Nelson, Where Pain Can Lead to Progress;The Deep Divide Over the
Merits of Animal Research Rages on at a Venerable New York Medical Institution,
NEWSDAY (New York), Sept. 26, 2004, at A03.
40 See id.
41 See FRANCIONE, supranote 20, at 53.
42 See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 296 (Peter Laslett ed.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) ("[Blut supposing the World given as it was to
the Children of Men in common, we see how labour could make Men distinct titles to
several parcels of it, for their private uses; wherein there could be no doubt of Right,
no room for quarrel.").
43 Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
44 FRANCIONE, supra note 20, at 53.
45 See FRANCIONE, supranote 2, at 38-39.
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D. Darwinism
Until Darwin's time, humans were thought of as one
category of beings and nonhuman animals were considered a
separate category; 46 this was largely based on the Creation story
found in Genesis. 4 7 After Charles Darwin popularized the theory
48
of evolution, such categorization was no longer feasible.
Humans were merely another link on the evolutionary chain, and
thus, the idea that humans had free reign over nonhuman
more difficult to justify morally or
animals became
philosophically.
According to one scholar, "[t]he reason
Descartes's view of animals is not possible today... is that
between him and us came Darwin. Once we see the other
animals as our kin, we have little choice but to see their condition
as analogous to our own." 49 While it had been generally accepted
that humans were pointedly different from animals because God
had endowed them with a rational soul, Darwin demonstrated
that the development of rationality was simply a function of
natural selection. Darwin argued that while animals did not
possess the same degree of rationality as humans, rational
thought was indeed present in other animal species. 50
In
addition, Darwin believed that the use of language-another
characteristic seen as being distinctly within the purview of
humankind-existed in varying degrees in animal species, often
through signals. 51 When the similarities among the species are
recognized, and when it is acknowledged that the difference
between humans and other animals is "one of degree and not of
kind,"' 52 it is increasingly difficult to see animals simply as
53
objects.
See id. at 36-38.
See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
48 See RACHELS, supra note 15, at 131.
49 Id. While it has become more difficult to justify morally the complete
disregard of animals' ability to feel pain in the face of modern science, there are still
some arenas, such as a "factory farm," in which "everything we've learned about
animals at least since Darwin has been simply.. . set aside. To visit a modern
[factory farm] is to enter a world that, for all its technological sophistication, is still
designed according to Cartesian principles: animals are machines incapable of
feeling pain." Michael Pollan, An Animal's Place, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, § 6
(Magazine), at 58, 62-63; see also infra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
50 See RACHELS, supra note 15, at 132-33.
51 See id. at 137.
52 See DARWIN, supra note 1, at 319.
53 Charles Darwin himself was opposed to the abuse of animals. See RACHELS,
46

47
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Around the time of Darwin, other philosophers who viewed
animals in a sympathetic and moral way became more prevalent.
For example, Jeremy Bentham anticipated a time "when the rest
of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never
could have been withheld from them but by the hand of
tyranny. '' 54
These philosophers further heightened the
awareness of the plight of animals.
E. Singer and the Advancement of Animal Rights
Although there have been champions of animal rights dating
back to Saint Francis of Assisi and the plight of animals has
gained the support of some of the world's most brilliant minds
such as Leonardo DaVinci and Albert Einstein, it was Peter
Singer's Animal Liberation, published in 1975, that brought the
moral issues concerning animals to the forefront of popular
dialogue. 55 Singer appealed to his readers' intellects rather than
their sensitivities by presenting the treatment of animals
56
philosophically.
In the preface to the first edition of his book, Singer related
that he was never "inordinately fond of dogs, cats, or horses in
the way that many people are" and that he "d[oes]n't 'love'
animals." 57
Rather, Singer is opposed to "arbitrary
discrimination."58
In adopting this type of rhetoric, which
presents the issues of animal rights and animal welfare as a
rational argument made by a philosopher rather than an
emotional plea made by overly sensitive "Bambi lovers," 59 Singer
supra note 15, at 212-13. His son, Francis Darwin, wrote that "[Charles Darwin]
returned one day from his walk pale and faint from having seen a horse ill-used, and
from the agitation of violently remonstrating with the man." Furthermore, "his
humanity to animals was well known in his own neighbourhood." See id. at 213
(quoting 2 THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF CHARLES DARWIN 374 (Francis Darwin ed., D.

Appleton & Co. 1905) (1887)). Darwin argued that while we naturally tend to have
more sympathy for a "harmless animal" and less sympathy for "vermin," we must
acknowledge that "the actual agony must be the same in all cases." Id. at 213-14
(quoting Charles Darwin, Vermin and Traps, GARDENERS' CHRON. & AGRIC.
GAZETTE, Aug. 1863, at 821, 822, reprinted in 2 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
CHARLES DARWIN 84 (Paul H. Barrett ed., 1977)).
54 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND

LEGISLATION 283 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Methuen & Co. 1982).
55 SINGER, supra note 26; see also Pollan, supra note 49, at 58-60.
56 See Pollan, supra note 49, at 60.
57 SINGER, supra note 26, at xxi.
58

Id.

59 "Bambi lovers" is a disparaging term often used to refer to those who fight to
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forced the readers of his book to take the issue of animal abuse
seriously. Indeed, since 1975, a great number of laws have been
passed to protect animals, 60 a casebook on animal rights has been
published, and approximately sixty law schools across the
61
country currently offer classes on animal law.
II. ANIMALS AND STANDING
As discussed above, in order to bring any suit, one must have
standing. 62 Animals are legally categorized as property and,
therefore, are viewed as legal things and not legal persons. 63 As
one scholar put it, "[w]e have assigned ourselves, alone among
status
of
'legal
animal
species,
the
the
million
persons.'... [Animals] are 'legal things.'... Without legal
personhood, one is invisible to civil law." 64 Thus, since animals
have no legal personhood and, as a result, no legally enforceable
65
rights, they typically cannot bring suit on their own behalf.
Consequently, it is left to individuals and organizations working
on behalf of animals to bring suit when animals need protection.
Because those bringing suit have generally not experienced an
obvious injury in fact, their cases are often dismissed for a lack of
66
standing.
It is well established that for a party to have standing, she
must demonstrate that she has suffered an injury in fact, that
her injury is traceable to the defendant, and that the injury can

protect animals from abuse. See, e.g., Jennifer Everett, Environmental Ethics,
Animal Welfarism, and the Problem of Predation: A Bambi Lover's Respect for
Nature, 6 ETHICS & ENV'T 42 (2001), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/
ethics-and the-environmentv006/6.leverett.pdf. Those to whom this term is
directed often take exception to the implication that their beliefs stem purely from
an emotional and sentimental outlook on animals. REGAN, supra note 36, at xii.
Those individuals can only overcome such accusations by "making a sustained
commitment to rational inquiry." Id.
60 See CURNUTT,supra note 29, at 4.
61 See PAMELA D. FRASCH ET AL., ANIMAL LAw (2000). For a list of current and
future animal law classes, see Animal Legal Defense Fund-Animal Law Classes,
http://www.aldf.org/windows/courses.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
62 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
63 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
64 WISE, supra note 31, at 4.
65 Occasionally, species of animals have successfully brought suit in their own
right, typically under the Endangered Species Act. See discussion infra Part II.D.
66 See, e.g., Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 97-99 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
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be redressed by a favorable ruling against the defendant. 67
These are the constitutional requirements for standing under
Article III. In addition to the constitutional requirements, courts
have established prudential limitations that must also be met to
establish standing. 68 These prudential limitations include the
(1) the parties may not sue for a
following requirements:
generalized grievance; (2) the plaintiffs complaint must be
within the "zone of interests" protected by the statute at issue;
and (3) the parties are generally prohibited from bringing a suit
to protect the legal interests of a third party.69 While the
constitutional requirements are unchangeable, Congress has the
authority to limit the prudential requirements by granting an
70
express cause of action within the statute at issue.
67 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("A plaintiff must allege
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief.").
68 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) ("Beyond the constitutional requirements, the
federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the
question of standing.").
69 See id. at 474-75. Of these prudential requirements, the one most often at
issue in suits involving animal protection is the "zone of interests" requirement. For
example, in Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, the plaintiff sued under
the Animal Welfare Act ("AWA") due primarily to his observation of the terrible
living conditions of various primates at a game farm and his intention to continue
attending the game farm. The court held that the plaintiffs aesthetic injury fell
within the interest of the AWA, based on 'logic, legislative history, and the structure
of the AWA." Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 444-45 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); see also Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 499 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
70 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) ("Congress may grant an
express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential
standing rules. Of course, Art. III's requirement remains ....").Suits surrounding
the Endangered Species Act often avoid the limiting effects of prudential standing
requirements. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 161-65 (1997). The
Endangered Species Act contains the following provision entitled "Citizen suits":
(1) [Any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in
violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the
authority thereof; or
(B) to compel the Secretary to apply... the prohibitions set forth in or
authorized.., with respect to the taking of any resident endangered
species or threatened species within any State; or
(C) against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the
Secretary to perform any act or duty... which is not discretionary
with the Secretary.
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A. Pleadingthe Injury in Fact
The greatest barrier that people and organizations bringing
suit on behalf of animals face in meeting the constitutional
requirements of standing is the injury-in-fact requirement.
Usually the injury is directly suffered by the animals and not by
the people or organizations that are bringing suit on their behalf.
In pleading such suits, the plaintiffs may not base their standing
to sue on harm caused to the animal. Instead, they must allege a
71
direct injury to themselves.
There are indeed many instances where people are able to
bring suit to protect the interests of one who is not in a position
to do so himself. For example, capable people may act as
guardians and bring suit on behalf of children or the mentally
handicapped.7 2 In those suits, the guardians have standing
73
based on the injuries that happened directly to the ward
because the ward has legally cognizable interests that he or she
is entitled to have protected. 74 For example, in Bauchman v.
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
While plaintiffs bringing suit under the Endangered Species Act still must meet the
Article III constitutional requirements, the prudential requirements need not be
satisfied. In Bennett v. Spear, the district court and the court of appeals held that
the plaintiffs who were suing under the Endangered Species Act did not have
standing because their complaints did not fall within the zone of interests sought to
be protected by the Act. See 520 U.S. at 160-61. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "Congress legislates against the background of our prudential standing
doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated" and that the zone of interests
test was indeed negated by the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act.
Id. at 163-64.
71 In Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, the court denied standing to
a humane organization that was trying to prevent the Navy from killing feral goats
on San Clemente Island. 765 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1985). In reaching its decision,
the court stated that "[a] general contention that because of their dedication to
preventing inhumane treatment of animals, ALVA members will suffer distress if
the goats are shot does not constitute an allegation of individual injury." Id. The
court acknowledged that it "may to some degree share ALVA members' distress over
a particular form of capricide," but was nonetheless unable to grant standing
without proof of injury. Id. The court found that there was proof of neither an
organizational stake of ALVA as a whole nor a personal stake of any of the
individual members of ALVA. Id. at 939. ALVA needed to "differentiate[ ] its concern
from the generalized abhorrence other members of the public may feel at the
prospect of cruelty to animals" in order to have had standing. Id.
72 See 4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FED. PRACTICE § 17.10[3][c] (3d ed.
2005); see, e.g., Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 545 (10th Cir. 1997)
(describing a case where a mother, as a guardian, brought suit alleging violations of
her daughter's rights under the state and federal constitutions).
73 See Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 545-46.
74 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 72, § 17.10[3][c]. This is such an accepted
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West High School, 75 a high school student sued her high school,
school board, and various individuals through her mother as
guardian. 76 The claim alleged that the student, who was Jewish,
was forced to sing Christian songs in her school choir in violation
of her First Amendment rights. 77 While the student's mother
brought the claim on behalf of her minor child, the mother was
not required to claim any direct personal injury. 78 The court
needed only to look at the injury to the student, and the effect of
the school's actions on the mother was not a relevant issue that
was ever addressed.
In cases involving animals, the person or organization
bringing suit is similarly trying to protect a being which cannot
voice its own concerns in a court of law. In contrast to cases
being brought by guardians of children or the mentally
handicapped, because animals have no independent legal
interests due to their classification as property, the plaintiff
cannot simply plead that the animal is suffering an injury as a
guardian can do for a ward. The plaintiff must instead plead an
injury to himself that is independent from the injury to the
79
animal.
For example, in International Primate Protection League v.
Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc.,80 plaintiff Pacheco, a
former employee of the defendant, together with animal rights
organizations, brought suit under the Animal Welfare Act to
become the guardians of monkeys that were being experimented
on in a particularly cruel manner. 81 The monkeys allegedly were
given inadequate food and water and were kept in unsanitary
conditions.8 2 One primatologist stated that he had "never seen a
laboratory as poorly maintained [as that of the Institute for
Behavioral Research]. '"83 Monkeys reportedly chewed their own
fingers and further mutilated their limbs that had been
principle of law that courts do not even address the issue of standing in these cases.
See, e.g., Bauchman, 132 F.3d 542.
75
76

Bauchman, 132 F.3d 542.
Id. at 545.

77 Id. at 546.

See MOORE ETAL., supra note 72, § 17.10[3] [c].
79 See, e.g., Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros.
78

& Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 336-38 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
80 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
81 Id. at 935-37.
82 See id. at 936; see also FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 72-73.
83 See FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 73.
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experimented on.8 4
The defendant-institute's inhumane
treatment of the monkeys was probably most strongly
demonstrated by the fact that Dr. Edward Taub, the chief
experimenter at the Institute, kept a hand that he had
amputated from one of the monkeys as a paperweight on his
desk.8 5 Despite these conditions, the United States Department
of Agriculture ("USDA"), responsible for enforcing the Animal
Welfare Act,8 6 found no violations of the Act.8 7 Pacheco provided
his information to the police who ultimately seized the monkeys,
and the monkeys were given temporarily to the care of an animal
88
activist.
Despite the cruel treatment of the animals and the fact that
the purpose of the Animal Welfare Act is, in part, "to insure that
animals intended for use in research facilities ...are provided
humane care and treatment,"8 9 the plaintiffs nonetheless had to
plead standing based on an injury to themselves.
They
attempted to prove injury in fact on three separate bases. First,
they claimed a financial interest as taxpayers in ensuring that
the National Institutes of Health, which funded the experiments,
respected the law. 90 This claim was rejected essentially as a
generalized taxpayer claim. 9 1 Second, they argued that they had
personal interests in the humane treatment of animals. 92 This
basis was held to be inadequate based upon the Supreme Court's
holding in Sierra Club v. Morton,93 in which the Court denied
standing based upon "a mere 'interest in a problem."' 94 Finally,
the plaintiffs tried to counter directly the concerns of Sierra Club
and argued that their personal relationships with the monkeys
would be upset if the monkeys were returned to the Institute,

85

See id.
See id.

86

7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2000).

84

87 See FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 73.
88 Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Inst.

For Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d
934, 936 (4th Cir. 1986); see also FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 73.
89 7 U.S.C. § 2131(1).

90 Int'l PrimateProt.League, 799 F.2d at 937-38.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 938. At first glance, it may appear that standing was argued based on
the humane treatment of animals, but it was, in fact, the people's interest in not
being exposed to the inhumane treatment of animals that was pleaded. Id. The
injury to the animals themselves was irrelevant.

93 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
94 Id. at 739; Int'l PrimateProt. League, 799

F.2d at 938.
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thereby arguing a more direct, specific injury to themselves. 95
The court replied that this case is distinguishable from Sierra
Club because the plaintiffs in Sierra Club were litigating over an
issue involving a national park and they could continue to use
the park if the defendants complied with the law. 96 The plaintiffs
in International Primate Protection, however, would never be
97
able to see the monkeys even if the defendants complied.
InternationalPrimateProtection highlights the treatment of
animals as property in the context of standing in two distinct
ways. First, in pleading standing, the plaintiffs had to establish
injuries that occurred to themselves, when clearly the intention of
their litigation was to prevent further injuries to the animals
undergoing the abuse. Essentially, the plaintiffs had to contrive
an injury that affected people so that the true injury-the abuse
of the animals-could be stopped. Second, in denying standing
because the plaintiffs would never see the monkeys again, the
court was essentially creating a barrier against enforcement of
the Animal Welfare Act and sanctioning abuse when animals are
owned as private property. This is because private ownership
precludes any further direct interaction between the plaintiffs
and the privately owned animals and thus bars any possibility of
showing a continuing harm. 98 Under the court's logic, "because
the monkeys were the private property of [the Institute for
Behavioral Research], no private person or organization could
claim standing to challenge the treatment of what the court
95 See Int'l Primate Prot.League, 799 F.2d at 938.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 See id. Injuries that plaintiffs have experienced in the past are inadequate to
prove a current case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution. See Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992). Moreover, when plaintiffs allege
injuries that will occur in the future, they must do so with specificity in order to
have injury in fact. See id. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the plaintiffs brought
suit under the Endangered Species Act and alleged that they had seen the
endangered species before and intended to see them again in the future, although
they were unable to provide a specific date of return. See id. at 563-64. The Court
held that "[s]uch 'some day' intentions-without any description of concrete plans, or
indeed even any specification of when the some day will be-do not support a finding
of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases require." Id. at 564. Thus, when the
plaintiffs in InternationalPrimateProtection alleged an injury premised upon future
interactions with animals, which were speculative at best due to the animals' status
as the personal property of their adversary in the lawsuit, their future injury would
also be speculative at best. Since there was no present or future injury, there was no
injury in fact. See Int'l PrimateProt.League, 799 F.2d at 938.
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essentially regarded as pieces of property."99
A similar method of pleading occurred in American Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. &
Barnum & Bailey Circus.10 0 In that case, Ringling Brothers used
Asian elephants, which are protected under the Endangered
Species Act, in its circus performances. 10 1 One of the former
elephant trainers alleged that Ringling Brothers prematurely
removed baby elephants from their mothers by force, left the
elephants chained for extended periods of time, and "trained" the
elephants by beating them with bullhooks. 10 2 The plaintiffs
sought, among other forms of relief, an injunction to stop the
horrific abuse of the circus elephants and to have Ringling
03
Brothers' ownership of the elephants forfeited.
The plaintiffs obviously brought suit to end the
mistreatment of animals, but they had to plead standing based
upon injuries that personally affected one of the plaintiffs. The
plaintiff elephant trainer pleaded that he had an aesthetic injury
04
based on his emotional attachment to the individual elephants.'
The court held that, based on his emotional attachment, he
would indeed be aesthetically injured if he decided to attend the
circus, and furthermore, he would be unable to seek
reemployment at the circus because he would suffer emotional
injury. 0 5 Although the court held that the plaintiffs had
standing, clearly neither the handler's employment status nor his
circus attendance was the purpose of bringing the lawsuit. The
injuries that needed to be redressed consisted of the beating of
elephants with sharp metal bullhooks, the removal of baby
10 6
elephants before they could be weaned, and other such abuses.
The court stated that "[w]hile the complaint here says the
elephants are still being mistreated, continuing harm to the
animals is not our main focus. It is [the elephant handler] who
99 FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 75.
100 317 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
101 Id. at 335.
102 Id. A bullhook is used in "training" elephants. It is essentially a long handle
made of wood, fiberglass, or some other material with a sharp metal hook on the
end, which is allegedly used to beat the elephants. A more detailed description is
offered by
the People
for
the
Ethical Treatment
of Animals
at
http://www.circuses.combullhooks.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2005).
103 Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 317 F.3d at 335-36.
104 Id. at 335.
105 See id. at 337-38.
106 Id. at 335.
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must be suffering injury now or in the immediate future." 10 7
Thus, the court explicitly stated that the injury to the animals
was not the focus of the standing issue. While the court's
recognition of an individual's ability to become emotionally
attached to animals is somewhat progressive, it is clear from the
court's statement that the suffering of the animals had no direct
effect on the standing issue. The court's concern was simply that
the handler would suffer injury resulting from his observation of
the elephants in their abused condition, and, because of that
injury, the handler would no longer be able to attend or work for
the circus. 10 8 By acknowledging that this was a sustainable
injury that would continue into the future, the court found that
plaintiffs had showed an injury in fact.109
As seen in Ringling Bros. and InternationalPrimate, due to
the pervasion of animals as property and without legal
personhood, courts continue to look at the abuse of animals as
tangential to the "real injury" of the person bringing suit. This
creates a fiction in these cases whereby an injury is essentially
fabricated so that the case to protect the animals may proceed.
B. The Current JudicialInterpretationof the Injury-in-Fact
Requirement as Applied to Cases ProtectingAnimals Does
Not Comport with Common Law Standing Doctrine
The Supreme Court has stated that the "[s]tanding doctrine
ensures, among other things, that the resources of the federal
courts are devoted to disputes in which the parties have a
concrete stake."'110 Moreover, it has held that "[t]he plaintiff
must have a 'personal stake in the outcome' sufficient to 'assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of

107

Id. at 336.

108 See id. at 338.
109 See id.

110 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
170 (2000). The Supreme Court has recently emphasized that "concrete adverseness"
is not the only requirement that must be met for constitutional standing. Clinton v.
City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 462-63 (1998) (citations omitted). Courts have held that
constitutional standing also involves "'defin[ing] the role assigned to the judiciary in
a tripartite allocation of power,' and 'a part of the basic charter ... provid[ing] for
the interaction between [the federal] government and the governments of the several
States.'" Id. at 462 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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difficult... questions."'11 1
The Supreme Court has therefore
emphasized that the doctrine of standing requires conflict
between the parties so that the parties will be zealously
represented and the real issues of the case will come to light.
In the case of animals that are abused, however, those basic
tenets of the standing doctrine are marginalized. Under a strict
property interpretation, the owner of an animal experiences the
most direct injury when the animal is abused, and thus the
owner is the most logical plaintiff. In most suits involving
mistreatment of animals, however, it is the owner himself who is
the abuser.11 2 Therefore, the owner of the animal is the one -who
could most zealously argue for the termination of the abuse of the
animal because he has borne the injury due to the abuse of his
own property; however, the owner is also the party who would
most often inflict the abuse upon the animal that is the very
cause of the lawsuit.
In International Primate Protection League v. Institute for
Behavioral Research, Inc.,113 the plaintiffs brought suit under the
Animal Welfare Act for horrific abuses taking place against
primates in a research facility.1 1 4 Under a strict property
perspective, the Institute for Behavioral Research ("IBR") could
have best advocated for the position that there had been
violations of the Animal Welfare Act. If the monkeys are to be
seen as purely personal property, then the abuse of the animals
would have devalued the IBR's asset (the monkeys), and IBR, as
the owner, would have been in the best position to advocate for
the
protection
of
the
animals-its
property-against
mistreatment. It was precisely the IBR, however, that was
inflicting the abuse. Thus, under a position that categorizes
animals as pure property, the owner of the animal is often the
best party to bring the suit and the best party to defend the suit.

111 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 583 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
112 For example, in Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, the plaintiffs

brought suit in order to stop the abuse of elephants owned by Ringling Brothers,
although they had to plead that the injury in fact was an injury directly to the
former elephant handler. See 317 F.3d at 335-36. If animals are to be viewed as
purely property, because the elephants were the property of Ringling Brothers, the
abuse of the elephants was actually injurious to the circus.
113 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
114 See supra Part II.A for a full discussion of the facts underlying International
PrimateProtectionLeague.
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Such a result is inconsistent with the aforementioned tenets of
the standing doctrine.
If, on the other hand, courts recognize that animals are
indeed different than other types of property, the standing
doctrine can be preserved in cases involving animals. By altering
the perspective of these suits from one based purely on notions of
property and toward one that recognizes that animals are indeed
something more than ordinary personal property, this
contradiction in the common law can be cured. If courts continue
to ignore this crucial distinction and treat animals as if they are
not qualitatively distinct from the typical piece of personal
property, they are furthering a legal fiction and will continue to
render decisions that do not comport with their own common law
standing doctrine, which requires zealous representation of
adverse interests. Once the courts recognize that animals-as
distinct from other inanimate objects-do indeed have interests
worthy of protection, the person who is best suited to protecting
that interest is someone other than the property owner because it
is normally the owner of the animal who is responsible for the
abuse in the first place. Thus courts must retreat from their
categorization of animals as solely property when evaluating
issues of standing in order to abide by their own standing
doctrine.
C. Animals Are Qualitatively Different than Other Types of
Property and This Difference Should Be Recognized When
Deciding Standing in Cases Involving Mistreatmentof
Animals
Animals, while considered property under the law, are
qualitatively different from what one would consider an average
piece of personal property. While the law views animals as
simply property, common sense and human experience dictate
that a living animal is objectively distinct from, for example, a
book or a carpet. Animals are legally property, but they have
crucial additional characteristics, such as life and the ability to
experience pain, which make them materially different from
other personal property.
1. Slaves Were Legally Recognized as a Qualitatively Different
Type of Personal Property
It would not be novel for the courts to recognize that there is
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a type of property that has special qualities making it
qualitatively different from other forms of personal property,
thereby entitling that property to certain special legal
protections. An analysis of the common law, statutory law, and
constitutional law surrounding slavery within the United States
reveals that slaves, while still classified as property, were
actually treated as something in between property and entities
vested with interests entitled to protection. 115 This analogy is not
made to assert that animals are in any way to be equated to
those individuals who lived through the wildly unjust confines of
slavery. It is asserted, however, that the legal reasoning that
was employed during the period of slavery-namely, that an
entity may qualify as property but still have legal interests that
go beyond those afforded to ordinary property-can be similarly
employed in the context of animals.
The common law recognized that slaves were more than
simply property in the context of criminal law. First, slaves
116
could be charged with crimes in the same way as non-slaves.
This was an implicit recognition of slaves as individuals capable
of making culpable choices and being held accountable for their
actions. Clearly, an ordinary piece of personal property could not
be so qualified. In addition, until statutes were passed making
the murder of slaves a distinct felony, the common law
recognized the killing of a slave as murder. 11 7 Indeed, some
states' constitutions directly provided that those who kill slaves
should be prosecuted in the same manner as those who kill free
people. 118 Again, there would be no such recognition for the
destruction of other forms of personal property, such as a book or
115 See Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language
of a Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1747-50 (2001); see generally A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael Higginbotham, "Yearning to Breathe Free" Legal
BarriersAgainst and Options in Favor of Liberty in Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1213, 1233-55 (1993) (describing ways in which slaves could seek freedom
by petitioning the courts).
116 See Note, supra note 115, at 1748.
117 See id. at 1748 & n.l1.
118 In State v. Coleman, 5 Port. 32 (Ala. 1837), the Supreme Court of Alabama
held that the "true purpose" of the provision of the Alabama constitution, which
states that "[a]ny person who shall maliciously ... deprive a slave of life, shall suffer
such punishment as would be inflicted, in case the like offence had been committed
on a free white person" is to secure for the slaves the same treatment by the
legislature that a free white person enjoys, and not to create a separate cause of
action. Id. at 39.
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a lamp.
In addition to the common law, some states had statutes
providing that slaves were able to sue under certain
circumstances to try to prove that they were actually free people.
For example, in Virginia, the Freedom Suit Act allowed slaves to
sue if they felt they were wrongfully enslaved. n 9 Under the
statute, a slave was appointed counsel to represent him in a
cause of action to prove that he was actually a free person. 120 In
addition, Virginia passed the Importation Act that precluded the
further importation of slaves into Virginia. 12'
Enslaved
individuals could bring suit under the Importation Act if the
slave owner imported them illegally. 122 The Virginia courts
interpreted the statute to presume that the slave bringing suit
was legally acquired and placed the burden of proof on the slave
to prove both that she was illegally imported and that she had
23
been a resident of the state of Virginia for twelve months.
Both of these statutes existed as a means to liberate those
free persons who were wrongfully enslaved, and not to grant
rights to a "properly" enslaved individual. 24
These suits
nonetheless implicitly acknowledged that slaves were, indeed,
See Higginbotham & Higginbotham, supra note 115, at 1234-48.
120 See id. at 1235-36. Although there were some differences, these suits were
akin to habeas corpus actions. See id. 'The statutes allowed slaves to file avowedly
fictitious suits for trespass, false imprisonment, and assault and battery and
pretended that the slaves were not slaves just for that one purpose." Steven M. Wise,
Hardly a Revolution-The Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for Dignity-Rights in a
Liberal Democracy, 22 VT. L. REV. 793, 820 (1998) (citing Higginbotham &
Higginbotham, supra note 115, at 1235-36 n.125).
119

121

The objective of the Importation Act was to reduce the domestic slave
population within Virginia and to maximize their value for sale in other
states by reducing foreign competition within the state. Unlike most
colonies, Virginia had a surplus of slaves. Fierce competition existed
between Virginia and international slave trading interests in supplying
slaves to other colonies.
Higginbotham & Higginbotham, supra note 115, at 1248-49 (footnotes omitted).
122 See id. at 1249.
123 Id. at 1250.
124 See id. at 1234-35 ("Freedom suits existed not as a means for blacks to alter
their legal status from slave to free, but as a recourse for those who were in fact free,
and who thus possessed a remedy for illegal enslavement."); see also Wise, supra
note 120, at 820 ("The statutes continued to assume that slaves were legal things,
not legal persons, and had no legal rights, including the power-right to bring suit.").
Thus, the rationale behind these laws was not necessarily to grant rights to those
who did not have them but rather to provide an opportunity for those who may be
wrongfully enslaved to be freed.
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living beings who were a special type of personal property. First,
the causes of action were primarily concerned with whether the
human being bringing suit did or did not bear the burden of
enslavement. 125 Surely no statutes were passed that allowed the
cotton grown by the slave owner to bring suit to determine
whether it was enslaved because such an inanimate piece of
property could never enjoy freedom. While the point may seem
obvious, it must be noted that this is because cotton is
qualitatively different than an enslaved person. Furthermore,
while these statutes did not directly recognize slaves as being
more than property, by allowing a slave to file a cause of action
under the representation of an attorney, there was an implicit
recognition that slaves were a distinct category of property able
to interact competently with an attorney and have their interests
represented in court.
In addition, these suits were only
occasionally won, so while the plaintiff was ultimately deemed to
be a slave, and thus a piece of personal property, the suits were
12 6
still able to proceed.
Thus, the common law, statutory law, and the constitutions
that existed at the time of slavery recognized slaves to be
different from other forms of personal property. While slaves
were still undoubtedly property, it cannot be questioned that the
law recognized that slaves had an additional quality that made
them markedly distinct. Rather than ignoring these differences,
the law recognized that slaves, while property under the law,
should be categorized as qualitatively different from other forms
of personal property.
2. Alternatives-Legally Recognizing the Qualitative Difference
Between Animals and Other Types of Property
Courts should take steps to recognize that animals are
clearly distinguishable from other forms of personal property.
From an objective standpoint, animals are significantly distinct
in that they are alive and can experience physical pain.
Moreover, animals have, in varying degrees, the ability to
rationalize; some, in fact, have the ability to communicate with
others of their species and even with humans.1 2 7 Indeed,
primates have been taught sign language and have demonstrated
125
126

See Higginbotham & Higginbotham, supra note 115, at 1250-51.

127

See, e.g., RACHELS, supra note 15, at 132-33.

Id. at 1233-34.
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a startling capacity to communicate. 128
For example,
chimpanzees have created "swear words" and have been reported
129
to sign the words for "Me cry" when their caretakers depart.
In addition, some chimpanzees have observed their sentences on
a computer program and have erased sentences that contained
grammatical errors. 130 This level of intelligence, rationality, and
apparent emotion, obvious in the higher primates and likely
existent to a lesser degree in other animals, is evidence of the
differences between animals and inanimate objects, both of which
are legally classified as property with no distinguishable
differences in the civil law.
A more subjective difference between animals and other
types of personal property can be seen in examining the
relationships between people and their nonhuman companions.
For example, approximately seventy percent of people with
companion animals celebrate their animals' birthdays, and
"[s]tudies show that the grief responses following the death of a
companion animal are comparable to those experienced upon the
loss of a spouse, parent, or child."'13 1 Moreover, in 2001,
Americans spent in excess of $28.5 billion providing for their
animals. 132 There are herbal remedies available for those pets
who feel stressed, and dogs are regularly put in "doggie day care
33
centers" while their human companions are gone for the day.'
At least when it comes to their own domesticated animals, people
generally view animals as vital members of their own family.
This is quite a different view than the public would likely
espouse regarding their inanimate items of personal property.
It is evident that the legislature has also recognized that
animals are worthy of protection by enacting statutes designed to
protect animals, perhaps most obviously through the Animal
Welfare Act. 134 While the courts have not always been effective
in upholding the spirit of animal welfare laws,135 it is clear that

128

See

CARL SAGAN, THE DRAGONS OF EDEN: SPECULATIONS ON THE EVOLUTION

OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 115-19 (1977).
129 Id. at 118.
130 See id. at 119.
131 See Byszewski, supra note 16, at 216-17.
132 See Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man's and Woman's Best Friend: The Moral
and Legal Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 48 (2002).
133 See id. at 48-49.
134 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2000).
135

For example, in State v. Fowler, the North Carolina Court of Appeals

20061

PAWING OPEN THE COURTHOUSE DOOR

the laws are passed by the legislature to afford a special level of
protection to animals that is not given to inanimate objects.
The courts should recognize that animals are qualitatively
distinguishable from other types of personal property in deciding
whether those who bring suit on behalf of mistreated animals
have standing. If courts continue to disregard the obvious fact
that animals are not only pieces of property but also that they
have additional features that make them much more than
property, they will continue to support a system of false
pleadings, which does not address the real interests of the suits.
It is abundantly clear that animals are more than simply
property. Yet in deciding whether those bringing suit on behalf
of abused animals have standing, that fact is overwhelmed by the
classification of the animals as property, and the animal's
interests-which, at a minimum, include the right to be free from
physical abuse-are not protected. Courts must recognize the
interests of animals in order to stop furthering the "standing"
fiction that exists with regard to animals and to comply with the
courts' own standing doctrine. People or organizations should be
able to present the injury to the animal directly in their
pleadings as the injury in fact and should be permitted to act in
their capacity as guardian or representative of the animal. Just
as guardians of minor children are permitted to bring suit on
behalf of those children without pleading a separate injury to
themselves, 136 courts should allow people and organizations to
bring suit on behalf of animals without having to plead an injury
separate from the abuse of the animals. To do so, courts would
not have to overturn the common law, which recognizes animals

reversed defendant Fowler's conviction under the North Carolina animal welfare
statute. 205 S.E.2d 749, 751 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974). Fowler beat his dog Ike and then
restrained him. Id. at 750; see also FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 136. The defendant
held Ike's head in a hole filled with water and would then lift his head. Fowler, 205
S.E.2d at 750; see also FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 136. He repeated this process for
about fifteen to twenty minutes. Fowler, 205 S.E.2d at 750; see also FRANCIONE,
supra note 2, at 136. To ensure that the dog was being adequately drowned, the
defendant's wife kept filling the hole with water. Fowler, 205 S.E.2d at 750; see also
FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 136. Following this, they untied the dog, beat it again,
and tied it to a pole near the hole. Fowler, 205 S.E.2d at 750; see also FRANCIONE,
supra note 2, at 136. The court held that in order to uphold the conviction, the action
of the defendant had to be willful, which means without reason. Fowler, 205 S.E.2d
at 751. If the drowning and beating was meant to discipline the dog for digging holes
in the backyard, this could be considered a justifiable reason for the abuse. See id.
136 See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
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as property. Instead courts would just have to recognize the
obvious-animals are more than the average inanimate piece of
personal property and they truly have cognizable interests
worthy of protection.
D. Exceptions-Casesin Which Animals Have Themselves
Brought Suit
No discussion of animals and standing would be complete
without mentioning that there have been rare cases in which
animals have been held to have standing.
While the
overwhelming number of decisions has denied standing directly
to animals, 137 there have been rare instances in which animals
have themselves brought suit, most typically under the
Endangered Species Act. 138
In those cases where animals
successfully sued, their standing was not challenged by the
defendants and the issue was not raised by the courts sua
sponte. 139 In the cases where the standing of animals was
actually considered by the court and the animals were granted
standing, the holdings have been heavily criticized as a
misinterpretation of the Endangered Species Act. 140 Therefore,
137 In Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New England
Aquarium, a dolphin named Kama was named as a plaintiff in a suit brought under
the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"), 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000), to protest
his transfer from an aquarium to the Department of the Navy where he was studied
for his sonar capabilities. 836 F. Supp. 45, 46-47 (D. Mass. 1993). The court held
that the animal itself did not have standing to sue under the MMPA and that if
Congress or the President wished to take the unusual step of granting standing
directly to an animal, they should have explicitly done so in the statute. See id. at
49-50. The court noted that § 1374(d)(6) of the MMPA references the Administrative
Procedure Act as the standard of review, which states that "'[a] person suffering
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.'" Id. at 49 (quoting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000)).
Thus the dolphin itself was not granted standing. Citizens to End Animal Suffering
& Exploitation,Inc., 836 F. Supp. at 49-50.
138 See, e.g., Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1447-48 (9th
Cir. 1992) (allowing a species of endangered squirrels to sue under the Endangered
Species Act, the National Forest Management Act, and the Arizona-Idaho
Conservation Act without addressing the issue of standing); Palila v. Haw. Dep't of
Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that an
endangered species of six-inch long finches "wing[ed] its way into federal court as a
plaintiff in its own right").
139 See Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc., 836 F. Supp. at
49.
140 In Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., the court looked to prior holdings
that allowed animals to bring suit under the Endangered Species Act and allowed
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those cases in which animals or species of animals were granted
standing, while noteworthy in a limited sense, do not create any
real precedent upon which to base an argument that animals
should have standing. This is largely because "animal species
have remained named plaintiffs in... cases in which the
defendants did not contest the issue," but "in the only reported
case in which the naming of an animal as a party was challenged,
the court found that the animal did not have standing to bring
41

suit."1

Whenever the case law on this issue has been assessed
directly by the courts, they have found the cases granting
standing to animals to be without any real impact on their
decisions because in those cases, standing was simply
unchallenged. 142 No decision has been more significant in this
respect than Cetacean Community v. Bush,143 in which the Ninth
Circuit significantly limited its earlier holding in Palila v.
HawaiiDepartment of Land & Natural Resources.144 In Palila,a
45
species of bird was directly granted standing in its own right.
In Cetacean Community, the Ninth Circuit stated that its earlier
statements in Palilawere "nonbinding dicta," noting that when it
wrote its opinion, three other published opinions on the case had
already been issued. 146 Because the standing of the other parties
was undisputed and the court was never asked to decide the
the Marbled Murrelet, a species of bird, to sue as an endangered species under the
Endangered Species Act. 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1995), aff'd sub nom,
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996). Similarly, the court in
Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources held that the Loxioides
bailleui, another species of bird, also had standing under the Endangered Species
Act. See Palila, 852 F.2d at 1107. These decisions have been heavily criticized,
however, and one would be strongly cautioned before relying on these opinions. See
Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 126 F.3d 461, 466 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1997) (maintaining that Palila and Marbled Murrelet granted standing to
animals "without significant analysis" and contrasted those cases with other
"thoughtful opinions" in which animals were held not to have standing); Cetacean
Cmty. v. Bush, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1210 (D. Haw. 2003), affd, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th
Cir. 2004) (stating that these decisions were just dicta and did not provide
"convincing authority").
141 Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc., 836 F. Supp. at 49
(citations omitted).
142 See id. at 49-50.
143 386 F.3d at 1169.
144 852 F.2d at 1106. Palila is perhaps the most widely cited case in which
animals were given standing.
145 Id. at 1107.
146 Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1173-74.
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standing of the species, the court explained that it had the
jurisdiction to hear the case without considering whether the
species of bird itself had standing.147
Thus, the court's
statements in Palilaregarding the standing of the species of bird
were "little more than rhetorical flourishes. They were certainly
not intended to be a statement of law, binding on future panels,
that animals have standing to bring suit in their own name
under the [Endangered Species Act] ."148
III. THE PROPERTY STATUS OF ANIMALS HAS BEEN WEAKENED IN
OTHER AREAS OF LAW

While the common law surrounding the issue of standing has
been rather recalcitrant regarding the legal status of animals as
simple property, other areas of the common law have been
receptive to the idea that animals are a qualitatively different
type of property. Specifically, the areas of tort law and family
law have indicated that judges do indeed recognize that animals
have a greater worth than other items of personal property. In
the area of tort law, courts have recognized the emotions,
companionship, and sentimentality that attaches to companion
animals.1 49 In the area of family law, courts have recognized that
animals do have their own interests that the law can protect. 150
A. Tort Law
As a general rule, due to the status of animals as property,
when an animal is wrongfully killed, the recovery is the
monetary value of the animal.' 5' In making that valuation, the
courts will consider any special value or particular
characteristics of the animal. 52 In the case of companion
Id. at 1174.
Id.
149 See discussion infra Part III.A.
150 See discussion infra Part III.B.
151 See Snyder v. Bio-Lab, Inc., 94 Misc. 2d 816, 818, 405 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1978) (asserting that animals are like "personal property
generally," and thus "the measure of damages for injury to, or destruction of, an
animal is the amount which will compensate the owner for the loss and thus return
him, monetarily, to the status he was in before the loss").
152 See Stettner v. Graubard, 82 Misc. 2d 132, 133, 368 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685
(Harrison Town Ct. Westchester County 1975) (confirming that the factors that
should be used to calculate the market value of a dog include "any special traits or
characteristics of value"); 4 AM. JUR. 2D Animals § 162 (2d ed. 1995) (taking into
account "any special value, particular qualities or capabilities" of an animal in
147
148

2006]

PAWING OPEN THE COURTHOUSE DOOR

animals, factors to be considered include purchase price,
If a
training, and the average life span of the breed. 153
companion animal has no particular value, a court may
sometimes
award nominal damages. 154
In addition,
consequential damages for items such as veterinary bills may be
awarded, and punitive damages are sometimes given for
particularly egregious behavior against animals. 155
Such
methods
of calculating damages, however,
afford no
consideration to the fact that to most pet owners, an animal is
156
more akin to a family member than a piece of property.
Some courts have recognized that companion animals have
value that goes beyond the strict market value of the animal and
thus recognize animals as more than just objects. 15 7 These courts
determining its market value).
153 The "purchase price, ... age, health, breed, training, [and] usefulness" of an
animal are factors that will be considered in evaluating its market value. See
Stettner, 82 Misc. 2d at 133, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 685. When it comes to domestic pets,
however, "[s]entiment... may not be considered since that often is as much a
measure of the owner's heart as it is of [a pet's] worth." Id., 368 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
154 See Brent v. Kimball, 60 Ill. 211, 214 (1871) (recognizing the availability of
nominal damages for the killing of a dog, as the killing was considered a destruction
of property); 4 AM. JUR. 2D Animals, supra note 152, § 165 (observing that the law
will imply nominal damages if an owner cannot prove the value of a dog). But see
Brousseau v. Rosenthal, 110 Misc. 2d 1054, 1055, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1980) (emphasizing that when a pet has no market value, damages
need not be limited to nominal damages because courts can assess the "actual value
to the owner" to properly make the owner whole).
155 See Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 812-14 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding
the trial court's award of $75,000 in punitive damages when the defendant, who was
entrusted with caring for plaintiffs beloved pet horses, sold the horses knowing they
would be slaughtered); see also Byszewski, supra note 16, at 218 (reporting that
courts have allowed reasonable veterinary expenses).
156 In some situations, courts have awarded individuals additional damages for
the loss of property that had special meaning. For example, individuals who lose a
family heirloom may receive damages for emotional distress. See Windeler v.
Scheers Jewelers, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39, 44-45 (Ct. App. 1970) (declaring that at the time
the bailment of heirlooms was made, the defendant was aware of the emotional
value the heirlooms had to the plaintiff, and thus emotional distress damages could
be awarded because they were foreseeable). In addition, when photographs or
videotapes are destroyed, courts will sometimes incorporate their emotional and
sentimental value when awarding damages. See Landers v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 915 P.2d 614, 618-19 (Alaska 1996). While the damages for the value of
the loss of a pet are typically restricted to the market value of the pet, the damages
given for the loss of photographs and videotapes are often the value of the item to
the owner. See id. at 618-19 & n.5. It is remarkable that even such inanimate
objects are often afforded more value as a matter of law than a living creature.
157 See, e.g., Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 97 Misc. 2d 530, 531, 415
N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1979) (noting that while an

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:455

have awarded emotional distress damages to owners and
assessed the worth of a companion animal by looking to the
"actual value to the owner."'158 The "actual value" is given in
place of nominal damages in order to account for the emotional
attachment of humans to their companion animals and
recognizes-either explicitly or implicitly-that animals have
their own inherent value, distinguishing them from other forms
of ordinary personal property. 159 Thus, judges have slowly
recognized that animals are distinct from chairs, tables, or other
items of property and that they have value as living beings.
Consequently, tort case law contains numerous decisions
awarding damages beyond the basic market value for the
wrongful death of companion animals, breaking away from the
160
legal classification of animals as pure property.
Some judges have awarded damages for emotional distress
when defendants' actions regarding companion animals are
particularly egregious. In Burgess v. Taylor,16' the plaintiff
became quite ill, and as a result, she could no longer properly
care for her two horses, which she testified that she "loved ... as
if they were her 'children."' 162
She contracted with the
defendants, and they agreed that while plaintiff would retain
control and ownership of the horses and could interact with the
163 If
horses, the defendants would care for them on a daily basis.
the defendants ever wanted to end the arrangement, the plaintiff
would take back custody of the horses. 164 Within a few days of
heirloom certainly has its own sentimental value, it is quite distinct from a family

pet because it is an inanimate object that is "not capable of returning love and
affection").
158 Brousseau, 110 Misc. 2d at 1055, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
159 Courts have acknowledged that the main role of modern household pets is
companionship. "By considering the loss of companionship when a dog is negligently
destroyed, the court more accurately values the lost animal, thereby more fairly
compensating the owner for her loss in property." Mercurio v. Weber, No.
SC1113/03, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 801, at *5 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County June 20,
2003).
160 "[M]any jurisdictions have relied upon various legal rationales to value
companion animals above their purported market price.... [W]hile the case law in
some jurisdictions is somewhat inconsistent, a number of states have modified their
legal theories in order to compensate companion animal guardians adequately and
deter wrongful conduct." Debra Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately
Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1077, 1080 (1995).
161 44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
162 Id. at 809.
163
164

Id.
Id.
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taking ownership, however, the defendants contracted with a
known slaughter buyer and sold the horses for $1,000.00.165
When the plaintiff indicated that she wanted to visit the horses,
the defendants engaged in a variety of reprehensible actions,
such as providing the plaintiff directions to false locations and
telling her that they gave the horses to an unknown individual
on a trail ride. 166 Eventually, the plaintiff discovered that her
beloved horses were killed in a slaughterhouse. 16 7 The jury
awarded the plaintiff $1,000.00 for the fair market value of the
horses, $75,000.00 in punitive damages, and $50,000.00 for the
tort of outrage, more commonly known as intentional infliction of
168
emotional distress.
In affirming the award for emotional distress, the court
highlighted the fact that the plaintiff thought of her horses as
1 69
her children and that she had been "pleading for their lives."'
Moreover, "[c]ompelling evidence was presented at trial
establishing Taylor's love for her horses."170 The court further
held that emotional distress damages would not be precluded
solely because the claims were based on animals. 171 Many cases
have not allowed recovery of emotional distress damages on the
basis that sentiment should have no bearing on awards made
172
regarding animals because of their status as personal property.
Those cases in which emotional distress damages have been
awarded, however, represent a promising perspective of judges
165
166
167
168

Id.
Id. at 810.
Id.
Id. at 810. The court named the four elements of the tort of outrage as

follows:
1) the wrongdoer's conduct must be intentional or reckless;
2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against
the generally accepted standards of decency and morality;
3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongdoer's conduct and
the emotional distress; and
4) the emotional distress must be severe.
Id. at 811.
169 Id. at 812.
170
171

Id.

See id. at 813.
See Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Iowa 1996). The court
in Nichols evaluated both those cases where emotional distress damages had been
awarded and those where they had not. See id. The court noted that "[i]n most cases,
it is held that the sentimental attachment of an owner to his or her dog has no place
in the computation of damages for the dog's death or injury and that no award can
be made for the value of the plaintiffs mental suffering." Id.
172

486
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who view animals as more than simple pieces of personal
property. Their opinions seem to recognize that animals are
capable of generating emotions such as love and companionship.
In some cases, the plaintiffs are not seeking damages
specifically for emotional distress but are simply seeking an
enhanced valuation of their companion animal that exceeds the
fair market value and incorporates the real value to the owner.
In cases in which companion animals either are held to have no
market value or when the market value is not a true
representation of the actual value to the owner, 173 some judges
have allowed the loss of the companionship of the animal or the
sentimental value of the animal to be considered as an element of
damages.
In La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 174 the plaintiff
had her small dog Heidi tethered securely in her backyard. 175
The garbage collectors, for no apparent reason, threw a garbage
can at the dog.' 76 The dog's owner heard the dog yelp, ran
outside, and saw that the dog was injured. 177 The garbage
collector laughed and left the home.178 The dog sustained serious
injuries and ultimately died. 179 While the trial judge included
the mental suffering of the dog's owner as a factor to be
considered by the jury in awarding damages, the Florida District
Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's decision and held
that "the basis of recovery may be either the market value, if the
dog has any, or some special or pecuniary value to the owner,
ascertainable by reference to the usefulness or services of the
See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Damages for Killing or Injuring Dog,
61 A.L.R. 5th 635, 657-60 (1998). While some courts strictly award only the market
value of a companion animal, other jurisdictions award the value of the animal to its
owner when the animal either has no market value or when the market value does
not adequately represent the value to the owner. See id. at 657-58. Still other
jurisdictions allow a choice between awarding the market value or the actual value
to the owner. See id. at 659. As early as 1906, courts considering tort cases have
recognized characteristics attributable to animals that seemingly would not be
attributed to any other item of personal property. See id. at 656-57. For example,
the owner of a dog could take pleasure in the animal's company and be proud of the
things the dog could do; those factors could be used in assessing damages. See Klein
v. St. Louis Transit Co., 93 S.W. 281, 282-83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1906).
174 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964).
175 Id. at 267-68.
173

176

Id.

177

Id. at 268.

178

Id.
Id.

179
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dog."180 Furthermore, the court noted that "[ilt is improper to
include an allowance for sentimental value of the dog to its
owner."18 1
The Supreme Court of Florida overturned the District Court
of Appeals' ruling, holding that "[t]he restriction of the loss of a
pet to its intrinsic value in circumstances such as the ones before
us is a principle we cannot accept." 182 The court went on further
to state that the affection an owner feels for her pet is something
that is real-and thus recoverable as an element of damages83
regardless of the animal's market value.
In some remarkable cases, judges have explicitly argued
against the classification of animals as property. In Corso v.
Crawford Dog & Cat Hospital, Inc.,184 Judge Friedman made the
bold statement that "[t]o say [a dog] is a piece of personal
property and no more is a repudiation of our humaneness."'' 8 5 He
forthrightly commented that "a dog is not just a thing," thereby
entitling the owner to more than simply the market value of the
dog. 8 6
Thus, while it is not asserted that tort law has
overwhelmingly recognized animals as more than simply
property, it is argued that tort law has clearly taken steps toward
deconstructing the position that animals are purely personal
property under the law and has recognized that animals are
qualitatively more than simple property.
B. Family Law
The "legal thinghood" of animals has been eroding in the
area of family law as well.' 8 7 Generally, when couples divorce,
the "custody" of the couple's pet is granted to whichever spouse
180 Associated Indeps., Inc. v. La Porte, 158 So. 2d 557, 558 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963), rev'd, 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964).
181 Id.
182 La Porte, 163 So. 2d at 269.
183 Id. ("[We feel that the affection of a master for his dog is a very real thing
and that the malicious destruction of the pet provides an element of damage for
which the owner should recover, irrespective of the value of the animal because of its
special training ....
").
184 97 Misc. 2d 530, 415 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1979).
185 Id. at 531, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
186 Id., 415 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
187 See generally Barbara Newell, Essay, Animal Custody Disputes: A Growing
Crack in the "Legal Thinghood" of Nonhuman Animals, 6 ANIMAL L. 179 (2000)
(providing a description of the changes in law and attitudes about animals as more
than just property).

488

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:455

has the valid property right in that animal.1 88 This is because
animals are simply another piece of personal property to be
divided with the rest of the marital assets.1 8 9 Thus, if either
spouse purchased the animal, was given the animal as a gift, or
in any other way had a rightful property claim to the animal,
that spouse generally would gain ownership of the animal. 190
Some judges, however, have moved away from awarding
custody of animals based on the simple question of which spouse
rightfully owns that piece of property. Instead, they award
custody by determining what is in the best interest of the animal.
In the oft-cited case of Raymond v. Lachmann,1 91 the New York
Appellate Division, First Department, awarded custody of
"Lovey," a family cat, based upon the cat's best interests.1 92 In
determining the custody of the cat, the court recognized that the
cat was already almost ten years old and should be able to live
out the rest of her life in the home where she had lived for the
past four years, noting that this was where Lovey had "lived,
prospered, loved and been loved."1 93 In making its ruling, the
court never explicitly addressed the property status of the
animal.
Instead, the court said that it made its ruling
"[c]ognizant of the cherished status accorded to pets in our
188 See, e.g., Hodo v. Hodo, No. 0954-03-2, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 39, at *1-5, *716 (Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2004) (affirming a divorce decree awarding possession of a
family dog to the wife on grounds that the husband had not shown the dog was a gift
rather than marital property).
189 See Desanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230, 232-33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
(denying the husband "shared custody" or "visitation" rights of the dog because
Pennsylvania law calls for all property rights that are dependent on the marriage to
be terminated).
190 See Hodo, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 39, at *4-5, *14. Some courts recognize that
animals have their own interests but still make an award based on who is the
rightful owner of the animal as property. In Akers v. Sellers, the court recognized
that while the dog had a market value of $25.00, the proceedings over the custody of
the dog were not frivolous because "no man can be censured for the prosecution of
his rights to the full limit of the law when such rights involve the comfort derived
from the companionship of man's best friend." 54 N.E.2d 779, 779 (Ind. App. 1944).
The court expressly declined to determine "[w]hether the interests and desires of the
dog... should be the polar star pointing the way to a just and wise decision, or
whether the matter should be determined on the brutal and unfeeling basis of legal
title." Id. The court did ultimately grant custody to the wife since it was a gift to her
by her husband. Id. at 780. The court made this award despite its recognition of "the
tragedy of [the dog's] consignment to the [wife] if, in fact, his love, affection and
loyalty are for the [husband]." Id. at 779.
191 264 A.D.2d 340, 695 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1st Dep't 1999).
192 Id. at 341, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 308-09.
193 Id., 695 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
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society [and] the strong emotions engendered by disputes of this
94
nature."1
While few cases go as far as Raymond by looking entirely to
the best interests of the animal, many courts have looked beyond
pure property ownership in awarding custody of animals. 195 For
example, in Pratt v. Pratt,196 a couple was arguing over the
ownership of two St. Bernard dogs. 197 The court held that while
it could not use the "best interests standards" and that child
custody statutes are inapplicable to matters concerning animals,
it may nonetheless consider evidence regarding treatment of the
98
dogs when deciding their custody.
Moreover, some courts have even awarded visitation rights
and support payments for companion animals in a manner akin
to that which is done for children. 199 By awarding visitation to a
spouse, the court is inherently recognizing the sentimental and
emotional bonds that are formed with domestic pets,
distinguishing them from other forms of personal property.
Furthermore, in the past, when a pet outlived its owner, the
only means that the owner had to protect the animal was to leave
the pet to a trusted individual in his or her will. 20 0 While the
focus here is on the common law, it is interesting to note that the
Animal Legal Defense Fund, in coordination with some of the
drafters of the Uniform Probate and Trust Code, has drafted laws
that allow individuals to create trusts directly for the benefit of
their animals. 20 1 These laws have been adopted by twenty-eight
20 2
states and are being considered in nine others.

Id., 695 N.Y.S.2d at 308-09.
See Rebecca J. Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning Issues
Relating to Companion Animals, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 226-27 (2003) (reviewing
cases in which courts have considered the animals' welfare when granting custody in
divorce proceedings).
196 No. C4-88-1248, 1988 Minn. App. LEXIS 1113 (Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1988).
197 Id. at *1, *3.
194

195

198 Id. at *3.

199See Arrington v. Arrington, 613 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)
(recognizing that, although animals are property, "[love is not a commodity that can
be bought and sold-or decreed," and affirming the visitation arrangements
previously made).
200 See Steve Ann Chambers, Furry Finances, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,
Feb. 11, 2003, http://www.aldf.org/article.asp?cid=105.
201 See id.
202

Id.
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IV. RECOGNITION OF ANIMALS' LEGAL INTERESTS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND ABROAD

While the idea of animals having their own legal interests
may seem novel, this concept has been recognized in varying
degrees both domestically and internationally. The following
examples demonstrate some of the more progressive steps that
have been taken toward recognizing the legal interests of
animals.

A. Recognizing the Legal Interests of Animals Abroad
In comparison to the legal treatment of animals abroad, the
United States seems to be among the least progressive nations.
For example, some European countries have amended their
constitutions in order to grant greater protection to animals. In
Germany, the Constitution has been amended to protect animals
directly. 20 3 The lower house of the German Parliament voted
overwhelmingly to amend Article 20(a) of the German
Constitution to read that "[t]he State, in a spirit of responsibility
for future generations, also protects the natural living conditions
and the animals within the framework of the constitutional rules
through the legislation and as provided by the laws through the
executive power and the administration of justice. '20 4 Moreover,
in 1992, Switzerland's Constitution was amended to acknowledge
20 5
formally animals as "beings."
203 See Grundgesetz
fuir die Bundesrepublik Deutshland [GG] [Federal
Constitution] May 23, 1949, Budesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGB1. I] 1, as amended, July
26, 2002, § 2, art. 20(a), available at http://www.bundesregierung.de/static/pdf/
GG engl_Stand_26_07_02.pdf.
204 Id.
(emphasis added); see also Germany: Equal Rights for Animals, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2002, at A6. The constitutional amendment did not grant rights
directly to animals. Instead,
[t]he Directive of the State (Staatszielbestimmung Tierschutz) declares
protection of animals a value and goal of the state, and mandates the state
to exercise this value in all its official capacities. By committing itself to
protecting animals, the state holds itself to a much higher standard for
fulfilling its obligations to animals.
...Animal protection as defined in the Tierschutzgesetz now carries
constitutional weight, and where the protection of animals and the rights of
humans collide, organs of the state will be compelled to consider the
constitutional status of animal protection laws.
Kate M. Nattrass, "... Und Die Tiere": Constitutional Protection for Germany's
Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 283, 302-03 (2004).
205 Jim Motavalli, Rights from Wrongs: A Movement to Grant Legal Protection to
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Other nations have worked to protect animals through their
common law and statutory law. For example, some Indian courts
have held that it is the duty of the courts to protect the legal
rights of animals. In Nair v. Union of India,20 6 a challenge was
raised to a Notification issued under India's Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals Act, which prohibited the training and
exhibition of bears, monkeys, tigers, panthers, and lions. 20 7 In
upholding the Notification, the High Court of Kerala held that
"'[it is not only our fundamental duty to show compassion to our
animal friends, but also to recognise and protect their rights.' 20 8
Thus, the court acknowledged that animals should be protected
not only because of a basic human sense of morality but also
because the animals themselves have the right to such protection.
As to statutory law, New Zealand passed the Animal Welfare
Act of 1999, which has a special provision protecting nonhuman
primates from unjustified harmful experimentation. 20 9
The
original bill would have granted the great apes direct rights,
including the rights not to be deprived of life, tortured, degraded,
or experimented upon when it was not in the best interests of the
"non-human hominids"; however, a milder version of the bill
ultimately passed. 210 The current law allows research, testing,
and teaching on "non-human hominids" but only permits those
activities when it "is in the best interests of the non-human
hominid" or when it "is in the interests of the species to which
the non-human hominid belongs and that the benefits to be
derived from the ... research ... are not outweighed by the
likely harm to the non-human hominid."2 11 While the bill as it
was originally drafted used much stronger language regarding
the protection of animals, just the fact that such a balancing test
was derived "[a]t the very least,. . . sends a moral message to
http://www.emagazine.com/view/?564&src=.
206 No. 328/2001 (India May 1, 2001).
207
208

See id.
See Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis,

114 HARV. L. REV. 1506, 1547 n.148 (2001) (book review) (quoting Nair v. Union of

India, No. 155/1999, at 38 (Kerala H.C. June 6, 2000)), aff'd on other grounds, Nair
v. Union of India, No. 328/2001 (India May 1, 2001)).
209 Animal Welfare Act, 1999, c. 6, § 85 (N.Z.), available at http://rangi.
knowledge-basket.co.nz/gpacts/public/text1999/se/142se85.html.
210 Rowan Taylor, A Step at a Time: New Zealand's Progress Toward Hominid
Rights, 7 ANIMAL L. 35, 37-38 (2001).
211 Animal Welfare Act, 1999, c. 6, § 85 (N.Z.), available at http://rangi.
knowledge-basket.co.nz/gpacts/public/text1999/se/142se85.html.
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other nations."
Perhaps even more significantly, some European nations
have passed statutes that explicitly grant standing to certain
environmental
organizations
when they sue regarding
environmental issues. Referred to as a Verbandsklagerecht in
Germany, such a law grants standing even when the
213
organization itself has experienced no violations of its rights.
For example, the German Federal Nature Conservation Act,
enacted in 2002, states that "[w]ithout having been subject to any
violation of its rights,"2 14 organizations whose purpose is to
"promote, for non-pecuniary purposes and not merely for a
limited period of time, the causes of nature conservation and
landscape management... [that have] existed for at least three
years '2 15 may file for a legal remedy.
While no such
Verbandsklagerecht has yet been adopted for animal rights
organizations, it is anticipated that one may be passed during the
next election cycle, particularly because approximately ninetyfour percent of German citizens supported the Federal Nature
Conservation Act, including the "introduction of the right of
2 16
associations to take legal action ... established in the [Act]."
Such a law empowering animal rights organizations would give
real power to the German constitutional amendment passed to
protect animals in 2002.217
B. Recognition of the Legal Interests of Animals in the United
States
In our own nation, steps have been taken to grant animals
protection beyond their current "property" status. There were
212
213

Taylor, supranote 210, at 38.
See Nattrass, supra note 204, at 304.

214 Bundesnaturschutzgesetz [BNatSchG] [Federal Nature Conservation Act]
Mar. 25, 2002 BGB1. I at 1193, as amended, § 7, art. 61 (F.R.G.), translated by
Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (E-LAW), available at http://www.elaw.org/
assets/pdf/de.nature.conserv.eng.pdf.
215 Id. § 7 art. 59.
216 See Press Release, Fed. Ministry for the Env't, Nature Conservation &
Nuclear Safety, Environment Remains High on Citizens' Agenda (July 2, 2002),
availableat http://www.bmu.de/english/the-ministry/pm/3618.php.
217 The environmental Verbandsklagerecht was passed in 2002, and it allows for
more effective enforcement of Germany's environmental protection policies under
Article 20(a) of the German Constitution. German animal-welfare organizations
anticipate the passage of a similar law granting standing to protect animal rights in
the near future. See Nattrass, supra note 204, at 304.
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two notable contributions in this regard. First, in Sierra Club v.
Morton,218 Justice Douglas wrote a forceful dissent arguing that
natural objects, including animals, should have standing to sue
directly on their own behalves. 219 Second, the State of Florida
amended its Constitution to protect animals from suffering
terrible abuses in factory farms. 220
That amendment was
approved in an advisory opinion issued by the Florida Supreme
Court. 221 While the impact of these two actions on the issue of
animals and standing has not yet proven itself to be terribly
powerful, they do demonstrate hope for progressiveness in our
own nation.
In his powerful dissent in Sierra Club, Justice Douglas
argued that standing should be given to natural objects, such as
rivers and forests, thereby giving a voice to the wildlife which it
sustains. 2 22 Justice Douglas argued that the river, forest, or
animal should be protected in its own right and not solely
because a person has an interest in that natural object. 223 He
suggested that "[t]he critical question of 'standing' would be
simplified... if we fashioned a federal rule that allowed
environmental issues to be litigated ...in the name of the
inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by
roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public
224
outrage."
Justice Douglas further commented that "[t]hose inarticulate
members of the ecological group cannot speak. But those people
who have so frequented the place as to know its values and
wonders will be able to speak for the entire ecological
community."22 5 Justice Douglas argued that those citizens who
have an interest in nature and have "hike[d] the Appalachian
Trail" or who have "climb[ed] the Guadalupes in West Texas"
should be empowered to bring suit on behalf of those natural
objects. 226 Thus, Justice Douglas argued that those people with
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
See id. at 741-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
220 See FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 21.
221 See Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. Re Limiting Cruel & Inhumane
Confinement of Pigs During Pregnancy, 815 So. 2d 597, 597, 600 (Fla. 2002).
222 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 741-43, 749 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
218

219

223
224
225
226
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Id. at
Id. at

743.
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ecological interests should be allowed to bring suit on behalf of
the natural object in the form of a guardian: "Permitting a court
to appoint a representative of an inanimate object would not be
significantly different from customary judicial appointments of
guardians ad litem, executors, conservators, receivers, or counsel
for indigents." 227 While Justice Douglass's dissent has never
been adopted, his arguments demonstrate that judges are
capable of very progressive thought when it comes to the issue of
animals and standing.
In 2002, the State of Florida adopted an amendment to its
constitution to protect certain abuses on factory farms. It is
common practice for pigs that are pregnant to be kept in
"gestation crates" on factory farms. 228 These sows are kept in
such tiny quarters that they are unable to turn around; they can
essentially only stand up, lie down, and perhaps take a few steps
An amendment to the Florida
forward or backward. 229
Constitution was recently passed making it a criminal
misdemeanor to confine a pregnant sow "in such a way that she
While the
is prevented from turning around freely. ' 230
amendment has been criticized as a frivolous change to the
state's constitution, 23 1 it was held to be constitutional by the
Florida Supreme Court. 23 2 It is a significant step forward toward
the recognition of the interests of animals who are subjected to
tremendous abuse.
CONCLUSION

It is widely accepted that animals are viewed as property
under the law. It is equally apparent, however, that animals are
much more than the average inanimate piece of personal
property. The law of standing should reflect that animals are
227
228

Id. at 750 n.8.
See Free Farm Animals From the Cruelty of Confinement-Gestation

Crates, http://www.freefarmanimals.org/gc-intro.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
229

Id.

FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 21.
The Florida state legislature has since attempted to make it more difficult to
amend the state constitution and has been looking to the amendment protecting pigs
as an example of why such changes are necessary. See Jason Garcia, Rail Backer
Seeks To Oust Foes: Effort Targets Lawmakers Defying Voter Initiative, ORLANDO
230
231

SENTINEL, Feb. 15, 2004, at B1; Joni James & Steve Bousquet, Amendment Plan
Takes Shape, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Apr. 24, 2004, at lB.
232 See Advisory Opinion to the Att'y Gen. Re Limiting Cruel & Inhumane

Confinement of Pigs During Pregnancy, 815 So. 2d 597, 600 (Fla. 2002).
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creatures with interests worthy of legal protection in their own
right.
Thus, while the courts may inevitably continue to
recognize animals as property, animals are qualitatively different
and the courts can and must take this into consideration when
deciding the issue of standing. It is critical that courts allow
people and organizations acting on behalf of an animal's best
interest-as opposed to the property owner himself-to bring suit
based on the injury to the animal. Limiting the party who can
bring suit to the owner of the animal contradicts the standing
doctrine because the property owner is typically the one inflicting
the abuse. He will not zealously represent the interests of the
animal because he would be arguing against his own abusive
behaviors.
The common law has proven itself willing to progress with
social and philosophical advancements and has embraced the
idea that animals have independent interests that are worthy of
protection. The idea that animals should be protected if and only
if a human being is adversely affected is antiquated, inhumane,
and out of step with reality. Thus, judges must continue to
become more progressive when considering whether there is an
injury in fact and consider that the animals themselves have
interests entitled to legal protection.
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